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A new Authentication Method Based on Cryptographic Identifiers CGAs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We define  in  the context of  this work a new EAP method,  that we call EAP‐CGA. This method 
performs  a  mutual  authentication  of  the  hosts  based  on  their  CGAs.  The  verification  of  the 
authenticity  of  the  provided  CGAs  decides  the  failure  or  the  success  of  the  authentication 
process. We provide also a new way on how to integrate this new authentication method in the 
cryptographic protocol of HIP, known as the HIP Base Exchange. Because HIP is a recent protocol 
proposal dedicated mainly to solve the mobility problem in IP networks, such an idea paves the 
way to authentication extensions related to this solution and has other benefits related to hosts 
identification, mainly coupling two identifiers of the same identity. 
Our  protocols  proposals  are  validated  using  an  automatic  validation  tool  and  the  results  we 
obtained show their robustness mainly against Man‐in‐the‐Middle and replay attacks. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Identifiers strongly evolved since the beginning of the Internet. Naming the 
communicating parties was one of the first issues and it evolved to more consistent 
services requiring new protocols and having needs for new identifiers. 
     This paper gives a short description of some cryptographic based identifiers that 
emerged in the recent past, along with their context, structure and usage. The properties of 
them are then underlined and compared.  
     The goal of this analysis is to find out the strength and weaknesses of those identifiers. 
We do not intend to bring practical solutions to the identification problem. Our objective is 
to underline several points we find out through analyzing the current identifier situation. 
These key points could serve as a basis for future works intending to define new identifier 
formats, possibly more efficient and consistent. 
     First of all, we need to clearly define the vocabulary – identification, authentication, and 
localization - used throughout the paper: 
─ Identification means assigning an identifier to the identity of the host. This identifier 
must be unique, thus, it can uniquely distinguish the host from others in the network. 
Two different identities should in no case have the same identifier. 
─ Authentication refers to the capability of an identifier to serve to authenticate its 
owner. The authentication here refers to the act of verifying that the presented 
identifier corresponds to the identity it is claiming to represent. One of the available 
authentication methods is based on proving the ownership of a secret, such as private 
keys in the case of the asymmetric cryptography. 
─ Localization serves to localize a host for traffic routing purpose. The location 
information can be carried into the identifier itself, for instance under the form of a 
topological location of the host. 
 
Our study focuses on the three following types of identifiers: Cryptographically Generated 
Addresses (CGAs) [1], Hash Based Addresses (HBAs) [2], and Host Identity Tags (HITs) 
[3] [4]. These identifiers have in common to support several of the identity services 
(identification, authentication, localization) that could help improving the working of the 
current networks, and satisfying their increasing needs for mobility, security, and multi-
homing. The analysis leads to wondering whether one of the identifiers is able to satisfy all 
the identified identity services. 
      Another interesting point is the combined usage of identifiers (HIT and CGA) to 
strengthen the security of the HIP application. Based on the authentication done by SEND 
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using CGA, we adapted this authentication protocol to define a new EAP method based on 
CGA, and a way to integrate it into HIP. A validation of EAP-CGA is performed.  
     This document is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes a survey of the main network 
identifiers. The context and the use of each identifier are described. Section 3 presents a 
more detailed study of the properties supported by those identifiers. Section 4 recapitulates 
the results and gives conclusions. In sections 5 and 6, we present respectively our proposed 
new EAP method based on CGAs and its integration into the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
[4]. The security analysis of the HIP vs HIP with EAP-CGA is discussed in Section 6. 
 
2 Description of the Selected Identifiers 
 
This section presents the identifiers CGA, HBA, and HIT focusing mainly on their 
structure. They are all based on asymmetric cryptography, that is, each host is assumed to 
have a pair of public/private keys, and an identifier generated from its public key. As such, 
proving the ownership of the private key serves to prove the identity of the host.  
 
2.1 Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) 
 
A CGA can be simply defined as an IPv6 address [5] closely bound to a public key. It is a 
networking-level identifier that was mainly introduced in the context of SEND (Secure 
Neighbor Discovery Protocol) [6] in order to secure the neighbor discovery [7] 
mechanism. CGA has the same length and structure than an IPv6 address with the slight 
difference that the last 64 interface identifier bits are calculated over the CGA Parameter 
Data Structure (CGA PDS) [1] thanks to hashing functions. The CGA PDS as depicted in 
Fig. 1 includes the public key of the host, the 64 bits subnet prefix and the SEC parameter. 
The SEC parameter is a value between 0 and 7, which allows the host to fix its CGA 
robustness against brute-force attacks.  
     The resulted 128 bits made of the 64 bit subnet prefix and the 64 bit interface identifier 
is the CGA address of a host. This CGA address helps the neighbors of the host to identify 
and authenticate the host. The neighbors only need to get its CGA PDS and to check the 
mapping between the CGA and the PDS. The SEND protocol defines the messages to 
communicate the PDS.  
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Fig. 1. The CGA Generation Algorithm 
 
2.2 Hash Based Addresses (HBAs) 
 
HBA is also a networking-level identifier having the form of an IPv6 address, and is an 
IETF draft proposal of 2007 [2]. The principle of HBAs is the same as CGAs: the interface 
identifier is cryptographically bound to the public key of the host. However, it is adapted to 
the multi-homing, that is, the possibility for a host to be attached simultaneously to 
different networks through different interfaces, and having several subnet prefixes.  
     A multi-homed host can generate a HBA with the same generation algorithm than the 
CGA. As depicted in Fig. 2, the only one difference is that the N subnet prefixes of the 
host are contributing to generate the 64 bit interface identifier.  
 
 
Fig. 2. The HBA Generation Algorithm 
     At this early level, it is worth noticing that the link between the HBA as an identifier 
and the identity of the host itself is consistent. Including the multi-homed information of 
the host in all its identifiers strengthens the representation of the identity by a HBA.  
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2.3 Host Identity Tags (HITs) 
 
While both CGAs and HBAs were introduced in the context of IP address namespace, 
HITs belong to a new namespace - the Host Identity namespace [3] – which was proposed 
in the context of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [4]. From a HIP terminology point of 
view, the public key of the host is referred to as Host Identifier (HI) [3].  
     The generation of the HIT is explained in Fig. 3, and refers to the ORCHID identifiers 
[8] as the HIT belongs to the ORCHID family. A context ID value is conventionally fixed 
to 0xF0EF F02F BFF4 3D0F E793 0C3C 6E61 74EA and the concatenation of the context 
ID with the public key HI is then hashed with the sha-1 hashing function. Then an 
encoding function over the resulted hash leads to a 100-bit value chain, and the 
concatenation of the 28-long prefix value of 2001:10::/28 and the resulted 100 bits gives 
the 128-bit HIT.  
     A HIT can be summarized as a 128-bit-long hash over a public key. The link between 
the identifier and the identity of the host depends exclusively on the strength of the hash 
function.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Generating a HIT as an ORCHID Identifier 
Works [3] considers extending the HITs that are today known to represent a single host to 
a representation of a group of hosts. The collective HIT is referred to as distributed HITs.  
     So far, the HIT has a flat structure, but in recent works [10], there was an attempt to 
define a hierarchical structure for HITs. This hierarchical HIT structure is depicted in Fig. 
4. The first 32 bits represent the HIP management domain tag of the host, and the last 96 
bits represent the host tag that corresponds to the hash over the public key. The hierarchical 
HIP helps strengthening the link between all the HITs generated by the same authority.  
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Fig. 4. Structure of a Hierarchical HIT [10] 
 
3 Properties of the Identifiers 
 
Our analysis focuses on the following properties: anonymity, authentication, identification, 
localization, security, and the requirement for an accompanied heavy structure in the 
networks. 
3.1 Anonymity 
 
The anonymity is the property that enables the hosts to reveal their identities to their 
communicating parties only. This is valid for the network environments where the level of 
trust is not that high and it aims to preserve the privacy of the users. For instance, the 
privacy can guarantee that the users are not traced during their moves. 
     Anonymity is becoming an ever increasing need and even sometimes, a legal obligation 
to the operators. Let us analyze now to what extent the identifiers CGA, HBA and HIT are 
able to satisfy the anonymity property. 
     HIP designers took into account this need for anonymity by distinguishing “public 
HITs” [3] and “anonymous HITs” [3]. Public HITs can be stored in public structures or 
directories, like DNS, LDAP… and are likely to be known by any entity asking for. 
Anonymous HITs are only known by their owners or their communicating parties. In most 
of the cases, they are generated by their owner. They are commonly used by HIP initiators, 
but can be also used by HIP responders. Referring to the protocol specification [4], it is 
recommended that a host has at least two HITs, one public and one for anonymous usage.  
     No anonymity is provided with CGAs and HBAs. They were originally designed to 
secure the neighbor discovery mechanism with SEND, that is giving the hosts the 
capability to advertise and prove their identity to their neighbors. As such, it makes no 
sense defining some anonymous CGAs or HBAs. It is contradictory to the original 
objective of these identifiers.  
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3.2 Authentication 
 
A host can authenticate by presenting both its identifier and its credential. The verifier has 
then to check the correct mapping between the identifier and the credential. That is, the 
credential (usually under the form of a digital signature) is proving that the originator owns 
the private key bound to the claimed identifier.  
     CGAs, HBAs and HITs inherit from the identity based-cryptography, and so they all 
naturally support the authentication service. However, in this section, we propose arguing 
on the robustness of this authentication. Claiming the ownership of an identifier like CGA, 
HBA or HIT is not enough to perform authentication. Other operations, protocols and 
structures are necessary.  
     For instance, the HIT is a hash of an RSA/SHA-1 or DSA public key, and any 
malicious node can claim an identity by generating a public key and computing a hash over 
it. The protocols related to HIP help solving the problem of “HIT ownership”. In HIP, the 
authentication is done in the first phase of the HIP communication, which is known as the 
Base Exchange (BE) [4]. BE is a cryptographic four-packet exchange that permits to create 
a HIP context between any two HIP communicating parties and to perform mutual 
authentication. Signing parts of the BE messages using the private key corresponding to 
the claimed HITs ensures the host authentication. We will give more details of the BE in 
Section 6. 
     The mechanism is pretty similar with CGAs. Any malicious host can claim possessing a 
fake CGA and thus a fake identity. To authenticate the node and thus verify its identity, 
there is a first need to check the public key matching between the PDS and the CGA and 
then the signatures appended to some messages and signed with the private key of the host.  
     Note that the authentication procedure based on these cryptographic identifiers may be 
strengthened from a security point of view by introducing some electronic certificates 
computed over the public keys of the identifiers. The certificate generated by some trusted 
Certification Authorities will help the communicating parties to more closely bind the 
identity to its public key, but at a higher cost due to the deployment of authorities, the 
configuration of new trust anchors on each host, and the maintenance of the certificates.  
 
3.3 Identification vs. Localization: A Real Trade-off 
 
Likely to the persons being identified by their names, the hosts can be identified by their 
network identifiers. Likely to person names, we expect the network host identifiers to 
remain the same, wherever the hosts are located. A HIT can be considered as a name, as it 
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is fixed to a host whatever its location. The host can be reached through this HIT at any 
time.  
     A CGA or HBA is an IPv6 address closely linked to the subnet prefix where the host is 
connected. The first 64 bits of the address are the subnet prefix itself and the second 64 bits 
are generated over one or multiple subnet prefix (es). As such, moving from one network 
to another for CGAs requires computing the address again. For HBAs, the recomputation 
is required only in case the new subnet prefix was not included into the previous HBA 
computation. This change of identifier weakens the link between the CGA identifier and 
the identity of the host. From this point of view, we claim that no real identification is 
provided with CGAs and HBAs. 
     We can conclude that there is a real trade-off between the localization and identification 
services in current network host identifiers. If the localization information is favored, then 
the identification information is disadvantaged and vice versa. 
     As far as we know, there is no ideal identifier supporting both services. Including the 
localization information in any identifier without decreasing its link to its fixed 
corresponding identity seems hard to achieve, but we expect future works to provide 
possible solutions to this problem. 
 
3.4 Security 
 
Securing hosts identifiers is an important issue to be taken into consideration when 
generating the identifiers. Also, adjusting the security level of the identifier depending on 
the trust nature of the environments is also very meaningful and useful. 
     Keeping the same level of security of any identifier is a negative point. For instance, 
using unsecure identifiers in untrustworthy environments makes the node vulnerable to 
many attacks, mostly the ones related to the identity spoofing. Also, making heavy 
computational efforts to generate a very secure identifier to be used in high-level security 
environments is not a good idea.  
     The CGA and HBA generation proposes to adapt the security level of the addresses 
defining the SEC security parameter (integer between 0 and 7). SEC value equal to 0 
corresponds to the lowest security level, while the value 7 matches the highest one. The 
higher the SEC parameter value is, the more expensive the CGA and HBA generation 
procedure is and the harder brute-force attacks are.  
     HITs are all generated with the same security level with a simple hash computed over 
the public key of the host. As such, all the security issue rests on the strength of the 
hashing function. Referring to the protocol specification [4], SHA-1 is the official 
algorithm for HITs, but we have to be careful and adjust the robustness of the hashing 
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function to the computational strength of the attackers. We also expect some future works 
to focus on making the relation between the HIT and the public key stronger and stronger. 
We also think about the alternative of increasing the size of HITs, but this idea is bad 
because the HIT should remain the same size than the IPv6 address to make the use of 
HITs transparent to current protocols, APIs and applications. Therefore, a more suitable 
solution is to include further information about the host into the HIT generation procedure.  
 
3.5 Deployment Requirements 
 
The main advantage of using cryptographic-based identifiers is their self-certifying 
property that links the public/private key pair to the identifier itself. No Public Key 
Infrastructures and trusted third parties are required for this certification purpose.   
     Sometimes, the introduction of new identifiers requires some modifications related to 
the current networking architecture in order to support their deployment. New network 
entities and parties or new features added to the existing ones might be needed, mainly for 
mapping purposes.   
     CGAs and HBAs are easy to deploy as no modifications are required in the networking 
architecture. The neighbor discovery mechanisms can be secured with the SEND protocol 
without any external entities, except the neighboring nodes. This deployment simplicity is 
a strong positive point for these identifiers.  
     HITs are cumbersome to deploy and manage in the IP based networks. To make use of 
HITs possible, [12] introduces a new Resource Record (RR) to the current DNS (Domain 
Name Services) and a new networking entity, called Rendez-Vous Server (RDV) [4]. The 
new HIP Resource Record contains the information related to the HITs of the nodes. As 
such, a mapping between the DNS namespace and the Host Identity namespace can be 
easily done by any DNS resolver. Another mapping is also required between the HITs and 
the IP addresses where the hosts are localized. This is the reason why RDV servers were 
proposed. They are responsible for mapping the HITs to the current IP addresses of the 
hosts. They are keeping up-to-date localization information of the hosts.  
 
3.6 Mobility and Multi-Homing 
 
Hosts are becoming more and more mobile and multi-homed. Devices integrate more and 
more technological network interfaces (e.g. 3G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth). The support of the 
mobility and multi-homing is one of the criteria for evaluating the identifiers.  
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     HITs are identifiers working above the network layer, that is, the mobility and multi-
homing issues that are networking-level are transparent for them. A HIP host is keeping its 
HIT fixed even when it moves from one network to another or when it is connected to 
different networks simultaneously. The mapping between the HIT and the IP addresses to 
which the host is reachable is updated by the host into its RDV servers thanks to some 
update messages. As such, HITs are offering the full support for both mobility and multi-
homing.  
     HBAs were designed to support multi-homing as the multi-homed network prefixes 
contribute to their generation. However, HBAs do not support mobility. In case of moves, 
the new subnet prefix must be integrated into the HBAs (unless it was integrated before), 
and a new HBA must be computed. 
    CGAs are very poor in terms of mobility and multi-homing. If the node changes its 
network, its CGA has to be necessarily recalculated again using the new prefix. 
4 Synthesis on the Identifiers  
 
We summarize the results of our analysis in Fig. 5. As a first conclusion, it is clear that 
HITs seem to be the identifiers offering the highest number of identity services. However, 
they suffer from the deployment issue in the networks. There is a need to introduce some 
cumbersome structures and this is costly in terms of administration, deployment and 
maintenance.  
     CGAs and HBAs are good identifiers from a localization point of view, but they do not 
support mobility. A host moving from one network to another is needed to recalculate its 
identifier. 
     Referring to the study we did, the following points were found out. There is a need to 
study further the HITs generation method in order to ensure their uniqueness and to specify 
in a more consistent way the Host Identity namespace. The proposition of hierarchical 
HITs can be a solution but this will lead to define another hierarchical namespace, along 
with the DNS one. Mature experiences with this latter namespace would be useful to help 
deploying the new proposal of hierarchical HITs in a secure manner. 
     The length of a HIT is limited to 128 bits. All the strength of this identifier rests on the 
hashing function used. That is why, it is highly recommended to strengthen the security 
level of HITs by adjusting periodically the hashing function robustness to the increasing 
computation capabilities of the attackers.  
     Also, it should be noted that the direct use of the public key to generate the identifiers 
CGAs, HBAs and HITs can raise some problems from the identity point of view. Usually, 
the validity duration of a public key is limited for security reasons, but there is no such 
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validity limitation for the cryptographic based identifiers. That is, in case of a 
compromised private key, the bounded identifiers can still be used, and spoofing attacks 
are possible. If an identity is changing its public key, it would be better that its old HIT is 
not reused by another entity, but we have no guarantee about this, except with hierarchical 
HITs. Each time a public key is changed, the identifier supposed to represent the identity is 
also changing.  
     For HITs that belong to the same host, there is no possibility so far to define a logical 
link in between. We strongly believe that identifiers of the same identity should have a 
clear link relation because finally they represent the same entity. 
     For HBAs, we outlined that no recent works have been presented. In our own point of 
view, it could be interesting having a stable HBA taking into account all the subnet 
prefixes that are visited by the device, and which does not require recomputation in case of 
moves. However, we must admit that it is hardly feasible to know in advance such subnet 
prefixes. 
     We think that a challenging issue is to define another format of identifiers able to 
support multi-homing but in more elegant and reasonable way than HBAs. Beyond this, it 
would be ideal defining an identifier gathering all the strong points of CGAs, HBAs, and 
HITs in one consistent format. 
 
Fig. 5. Analysis Summary 
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5 Defining a new EAP Method: EAP-CGA 
 
5.1 EAP Protocol Overview 
 
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic authentication framework, 
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that provides an infrastructure 
for network access clients and authentication servers. It is described in [16]. 
EAP by itself does not perform the act of authentication; it merely provides a mean for the 
negotiation between the user and the authentication server and it is augmented with an 
authentication method that has its own requirements and procedures. EAP has gained 
popularity in the recent years due to the flexibility it provides. In fact, it does not specify 
any specific authentication mechanism. Instead, it is able to support any existing legacy 
authentication mechanisms as well as newer and stronger ones able to appear. 
EAP permits the negotiation of the parameters needed to process the authentication of the 
user. So it makes sense that EAP includes start and end messages and a set of middle 
messages. There are four types of messages in EAP: 
 
• EAP request message (authenticator to user) 
• EAP response message (user to authenticator) 
• EAP success 
• EAP failure 
 
Table 1 shows the format of EAP packets. 
 
 
Table 1. EAP Packet Format 
 
Request and response messages are used for all information exchanges and by using an 
EAP type field. Further EAP request and response messages can be created for exchanging 
a variety of information types. 
For instance, EAP request/identity is a message sent by the server, requesting the user to 
present his identity, for example, a name or any other type of identity. However most of 
type numbers are used to identify authentication methods used, such as EAP-MD5, EAP-
TLS [17]. . . 
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The flexibility of using type field for creating a variety of exchanges is the reason for 
The so-called “extensible”: indeed, new authentication methods can be introduced easily. 
EAP success and failure messages serve to indicate whether the authentication process is 
completed. 
Table 2 summarizes the different EAP message types. 
 
 
Table 2. EAP Messages Types 
 
Concerning the communication model in the presence of EAP, it is almost a three-party 
based model that comprises the following elements like in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. EAP Three-Party Communication Model 
 
 
• Peer: represents the host attempting to connect to the network through the edge device. 
• Authenticator: is in charge of access control on behalf of the network. 
• EAP Server: terminates the EAP authentication method and other EAP-related 
functions. 
Note that, although we mostly deal with three-party EAP models, a two party-EAP model 
can be used for some contexts. At that time, the EAP ends at the authenticator, and hence 
the authenticator is co-located with the EAP server. 
 
5.2  Motivations 
 
CGAs are classically used for a purpose of authentication in the context of SEND. The 
EAP framework [16] is designed to support many different authentication mechanisms and 
allows the peers to negotiate their authentication mechanism of choice rather than to be 
restricted to specific authentication mechanisms. 
 
This is why the idea of proposing a new EAP authentication method based on the use of 
CGAs is pretty interesting. We propose a new EAP method called EAP-CGA. It is based 
on exchanging the CGAs of the peers in order to support the mutual authentication 
between peers. The verification of the CGAs and the PDS at the two parties’ results in the 
success or failure of the authentication. 
However, it is interesting to clear the following architectural point. EAP can run directly at 
link layer with no requirement for a network layer protocol, such as IP. This is referred to 
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as EAP over LAN (EAPOL) [16]. In this case, the host uses EAP to be authenticated and 
to be next able to have an IP address and access the network. 
However, in our case, EAP-CGA runs over the IP protocol. Obviously, the host is 
authenticated using its CGA, i.e. its IP address. The EAP messages are carried into the IP 
packets. This situation is mainly faced in cases where the host is multi-homed, for instance, 
when the host needs to be connected to a second network, the authentication process can be 
processed using this method. 
 
5.3  EAP-CGA Method Description 
 
Our protocol overview here is based on a two-party model, in which the two peers deal 
with each other in order to perform a mutual authentication based on their CGAs. Thus, 
every peer acts at the same time as a client and an authenticator. 
The exchange of messages for the EAP-CGA procedure is shown in Figure 7 and 
performed as described in the following.  
As known in EAP, the messages from the initiating party to the responding one are carried 
into EAP-request messages, while in the reverse case, they are carried into the EAP-
response messages. 
 
 
Fig. 7. EAP-CGA Method Messages 
 
 
• The first exchange provides the first party (party A) with information on the other 
party identity. This exchange starts with A sending an EAP-request/identity packet 
to B which in turn responds with an EAP-response identity packet that includes the 
identity of B, i.e. its CGA in the studied case. 
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• Once the identity of B is provided to A, the EAP signaling starts with A sending an 
EAP-request packet with an EAP-TYPE parameter requesting that EAP-CGA is 
used as the authentication method and informing that an EAP-data field carries a 
Rand-A nonce, generated by A. 
 
• B responds with an EAP-response message with the same EAP-TYPE field, i.e., 
EAP-CGA, that encapsulates a signed data field containing its public key, its PDS, 
echoed Rand-A and another self-generated nonce Rand-B. The signature is issued 
using the private key of B. 
 
• Upon receiving this message, A decrypts the signed field using the public key of B, 
it verifies that it has sent the corresponding EAP request packet using the nonce 
Rand-B, and then it verifies the identity of B by verifying the matching between the 
sent CGA and PDS as described in [1]. If the verification succeeds, the next step is 
for A sending an EAP-request message containing its CGA and a signed field 
including its public key, PDS and the nonce Rand-B. The private key of A is used 
to sign this field. In the case where the verification fails, an EAP-failure message is 
sent from A to B to indicate that the authentication failed and to stop the method 
processing. 
 
• Then B decrypts the signed field, it verifies the identity of A by verifying the CGA 
and the PDS of A. If the authentication is successfully completed, an EAP-success 
message is sent from B to A, unless it is an EAP-failure message that indicates the 
reverse. 
 
6 EAP-CGA Integration into HIP BE 
6.1 HIP Communications 
 
Obviously, the new protocol HIP [3][4] specifies a different way for establishing HIP 
based communications and proposes for this a new packet type, the HIP packet one [4]. If 
two hosts want to communicate using HIP, two phases are needed: the HIP Base Exchange 
[4] and the secured data transfer [3]. 
The BE establishes a security association between two hosts [4]. It consists in a four-way 
handshake based on the exchange of HIP packets between the host which triggers the 
communication, referred to as the initiator, and its peer host designated as the responder. 
After the BE is finished and the HIP association is established, the two hosts are ready to 
start the second phase of data exchange in a secure manner.  
 
The main purpose of the BE is to establish what we call a HIP association [4] between the 
initiator and the responder. It supports mutual authentication based on public/private keys 
of hosts, symmetric D-H key agreement and DoS (Denial of Service) prevention 
mechanism. The different messages exchanged during the BE are shown in Figure 8. 
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Fig. 8. HIP Base Exchange 
 
The Initiator starts by sending an empty message I1 to the Responder, containing only the 
initiator and responder HITs (HIT-I and HIT-R). 
Even before the Responder receives the I1 message, it precomputes a partial R1 message. 
The pre-computed R1 includes the HIT-R, the Responder’s Diffie-Hellman key, the 
Responder’s host identity HI-R (i.e. a public key), the proposed cryptographic algorithms 
for the rest of the Base Exchange (HIP transforms), the proposed IPsec algorithms (ESP 
transforms), and an ECHO Request field. The ECHO Request contains data that the 
Initiator returns unmodified in the following message I2. This precomputed message is 
signed by the responder. 
 
After receiving an I1, the responder adds a puzzle and the HIT-R to the message and sent 
it. The Puzzle parameter in R1 contains a cryptographic puzzle [3][4], which the Initiator is 
required to solve before sending the following packet I2. This is to prevent against DoS 
attacks. When receiving R1, the initiator checks the signature, solves the puzzle and starts 
creating the I2 packet. This latter contains the initiator’s Diffie-Hellman key, the HIP and 
ESP transforms proposed by the initiator, the puzzle and its solution, the Initiator public 
key (HI-I) encrypted using the new session key, and the Echo Response. All the I2 is 
signed. 
 
The responder then verifies the puzzle solution, it computes the session keys, it decrypts 
HI-I, and it verifies the signature on I2. The Responder then sends R2, which contains the 
SPI for the Initiator-to-Responder IPsec SA, an HMAC computed using the session key, 
and a signature. For the Initiator, the exchange is concluded by the receipt of R2 and the 
verification of the HMAC and the signature. 
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6.2 Motivations 
 
HIP is one of the most prominent solutions for providing secure mobility in future IP 
networks. Integrating existing authentication mechanisms in HIP communications is a 
necessity for the deployment of this protocol in current architectures. 
Combining EAP authentication mechanisms with HIP is an interesting proposal and can 
add many useful extensions to HIP like access control mechanisms and interactions with 
AAA architectures. 
In fact, as described in chapter one, HIP BE permits only a mutual authentication based on 
the hosts’ HITs, it means that no real user authentication is provided since many users on 
the same host are presented with the same HIT. Adding legacy user authentication 
mechanisms to HIP like EAP can solve this problem. 
On the other hand, EAP is most of the time used in current architectures in interaction with 
AAA architectures. Using EAP with HIP may prepare for future HIP interactions with such 
architectures. 
In our work, we propose to integrate the needed negotiation messages for our method 
EAP-CGA in the HIP BE. The first advantage of such proposal is the HIP interaction with 
EAP, and AAA architectures. The second one is the strengthened identification. With the 
original HIP BE, the identity of the host is represented under the form of HIT. Adding 
EAP-CGA will strengthen the link between the identifiers of the same host: HIT and CGA. 
A host can easily check that both HIT and CGA were generated with the same public key. 
 
6.3  Integration of EAP and EAP-CGA into HIP 
 
[16] is a recent IETF draft that proposes a solution to integrate EAP data into HIP 
messages defining two EAP parameters: EAP-SIGNED and EAP-UNSIGNED. These 
parameters can be used in R1, I2, R2 and UPDATE control packets. Sometimes the EAP 
negotiation is longer than the HIP BE, thus it can be continued running just after BE with 
UPDATE packets. 
As described in figure 9, the EAP-CGA messages can be piggybacked into the BE and 
UPDATE packets. First, the responder announces in R1 that there is a service requiring 
authentication using the SERVICE OFFER parameter. The initiator transmits the 
agreement using the SERVICE ACK parameter. The EAP-CGA negotiation messages then 
starts and completes piggybacked into the BE exchanges and later the UPDATE messages. 
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Fig. 9. Integrating EAP-CGA in HIP BE 
7  Security Analysis 
 
We propose to use some validation tools to verify the security properties of our resulting 
protocols, along with a security analysis. First we present the validation tool in use 
(AVISPA) followed by a security analysis of the EAP-CGA method and HIP BE with 
EAP-CGA. 
 
7.1  AVISPA Tool 
 
The validation tool we selected is AVISPA [14]. It is a push-button tool for building and 
analyzing security protocols. It provides a role-based expressive formal language for 
protocol specification and it integrates four different back-ends that perform the actual 
analysis of the protocol. As displayed in Figure 10, the AVISPA tool enjoys a graphical 
user interface that facilitates the editing of the protocol specifications and the selection of 
the back-end in use. 
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Fig. 10. AVISPA Web Tool 
 
AVISPA Web Tool 
The architecture of the tool is presented in Figure 11. The user interacts with the tool by 
specifying the protocol he is willing to check and the security properties he wishes to 
verify in the AVISPA language. The High level Protocol Specification Language 
HLPSL) [14] is used to specify the protocol to the tool. 
 
Fig. 11. AVISPA Architecture 
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This security problem is processed by the tool as follows: The HLPSL specification is 
translated into Intermediate Format (IF) [14] specification, a lower level language. This 
translation is performed by a translator called HLPSL2IF [14]. 
This step is completely transparent to the user. IF specifications are inputs for the different 
back-ends of the tool, which implement different analysis techniques. In the current 
version of AVISPA, four back-ends are in use: 
 
• On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) [23] 
• Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) [24] 
• SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) [25] 
• Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security 
Protocols (TA4SP) [26] 
 
 
HLPSL 
As mentioned above, HLPSL is a role-based language. In fact, each participant in the 
protocol is presented in a separate role called “Basic Role“. In this module, we specify 
which parameters the participant initially knows and its initial state. It includes also a 
section called ”transitions” where we specify the received and sent messages and how 
they can interfere with the role’s state. 
In addition to basic roles, there are also composition roles, called “session”, that HLPSL 
defines. They are used to combine different basic roles and to execute them in parallel. 
They initiate one instance of each basic role and thus, one run of the concerned protocol. 
There is also a top level role, called “environment role”, where we can define what 
information an intruder can have access to and how and when he can interfere with the 
protocol. 
Till now, we presented only the different semantics to use in order to describe the protocol 
to be analyzed but the security properties need to be verified. They are defined as goal 
facts in the transition section of each role and in a separate section, called “goals“. In this 
section, we specify which combinations of those goal facts can be considered as an attack. 
 
7.2  EAP-CGA Security Analysis 
 
EAP-CGA specification in HLPSL contains two roles, Alice and Bob that present the two 
peers trying to authenticate each other using this method. Figure 12 presents an extract of 
this specification.  
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Fig. 12. EAP-CGA Specification in HLPSL 
 
 
The analysis result is shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Fig. 13. EAP-CGA Analysis Result 
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We succeeded to verify the following security properties: 
 
• Mutual authentication: Both peers can authenticate each other using their private 
keys. In fact, in EAP-CGA, every party of the communication sends at a certain time a 
message encrypted with its private key. Thus, the corresponding party can verify the 
authenticity of the message by doing decryption using the corresponding public key. 
 
• Protection against replay attacks: In order to verify whether the protocol resists to 
replay attacks, we can declare two parallel sessions at the top-level composed role. In that 
case AVISPA tries to re-send old messages used in another session to test whether this will 
be detected. 
 
In our method, the result of the validation shows that EAP-CGA is robust against such type 
of attacks. The freshness of the sent messages is supported by the two nonces: Na and Nb. 
 
• Integrity protection: It provides data authentication and protection against 
unauthorized modifications. In our case, we are mainly interested in testing the integrity of 
the parameters used to make the verification of the identity of the peer, i.e., the PDS. 
Communicating the PDS in a signed field permits to support integrity. 
However, the use of the asymmetric cryptography in our method may cause heavy 
computational consumption at the two parties. This is why EAP-CGA may not be suitable 
for authentication in environments with low-level consumption. 
There is also the problem of the identity protection. In fact, the CGA of the peers are 
communicated in clear in our method messaging. This can be a serious security problem in 
contexts where the secrecy of users’ identity is of relevant importance. 
 
7.3 Security Analysis of BE with EAP-CGA 
 
The objective of this section is first to check whether the introduction of the new EAP 
parameters into BE weakens the security of the BE protocol and second to detect possible 
new security threats related to that.  
For that purpose, two steps are performed, validating HIP BE with and without EAP-CGA 
and then comparing the results. 
 
Validation of HIP BE 
HIP specification in HLPSL is based on two basic roles: Alice and Bob representing the 
initiator and the responder. Figure 14 shows an extract of the HLPSL specification of the 
HIP BE protocol. 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________25 
 
 
Fig. 14. HIP BE Specification in HLPSL 
 
The security properties we mainly tested are Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) and Replay 
attacks.  
After running AVISPA, we got the results depicted in Figure 15. That is, no security 
threats were found by AVISPA. That means that the protocol is resistant to MitM attacks. 
A MiTM attack means that the intruder is attempting to make the two communicating 
parties believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection while 
the entire communication is under control of the intruder. However, this is obviously not 
possible between the initiator and the responder. 
 
 
Fig. 15. HIP BE Analysis result 
 
 
From the initiator’s point of view, the identity of the responder is got from a secure 
DNS as described in [27] and thus, it can validate the packets coming from the responder 
using this information. 
For the responder, it can verify the HI of the initiator and its level of trust after receiving 
the I2 packet using any trusted way. However, the HIP BE opportunistic mode where the 
initiator chooses to use anonymous HITs increases the risk of a MitM attack. This is why it 
is almost the time not preferred to accept such type of communications. 
AVISPA did not detect any replay attack threats on the protocol. 
 
 
Validation of HIP BE with EAP-CGA 
We focus on the integration of EAP-CGA into HIP security issues. 
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The protocol specifications contain obviously the same basic roles. The only slight 
difference is that we include in the definition of each role the new EAP parameters. Figure 
16 gives an extract of the HLPSL specifications. 
 
 
Fig. 16. EAP-CGA Integration into HIP BE Analysis Result 
 
After running this specification with AVISPA, we got the result that no new security 
threats were detected due to integration of our method into the BE.  
 
Analysis of HIP BE with / without EAP-CGA 
The results were interesting as we succeeded integrating EAP-CGA into HIP BE to 
strengthen the authentication process between the initiator and the responder. 
However, note that if new threats were found, this could have been easily solved by 
encapsulating the new EAP parameters into the ENCRYPTED parameter defined in HIP 
specifications [4]. 
 
Another point is related to an important security property out of scope of the AVISPA tool, 
which is the location privacy. This property is not supported by the new BE with EAP-
CGA method. 
Every message is carrying the HIT of the host coupled with its CGA in cleartext format. 
That means that any one listening to the communication can easily make the relationship 
between the identity of the host, i.e., its HIT, and its location, i.e., its CGA. In that case, 
any topological location change of the host can be traced. 
This is why, when using our method, this point must be taken into consideration especially 
in environments where the location privacy is a real security challenge. 
To solve this problem, the use of “blind HITs” as defined in [29] can hide this relation and 
thus ensure the location privacy. 
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8 Conclusions  
 
In the first part of this report, we presented a study and a comparative analysis of three 
promising cryptographic identifiers: HITs, CGAs and HBAs. We provided also an 
overview of the EAP framework as a prominent authentication solution alongside with the 
new mobility protocol HIP.  
We provided later the basic lines of the EAP-CGA method as a new EAP authentication 
method that consists mainly on providing mutual authentication of the peers using their 
CGAs verification. 
We provided also a new extension to the HIP solution, in which we tried to integrate the 
EAP-CGA authentication mechanism with the cryptographic protocol that HIP proposes, 
the BE. This extension paves the way for integrating authentication mechanisms in HIP 
and it provides a new way to link the different identifiers of the same host. 
The last part of the work consisted on validating those new protocols from a security 
point of view using the AVISPA validation tool. This step was a good opportunity to 
enhance our knowledge about protocol specification and validation and it allowed us to 
learn a new specification language, HLPSL. The detailed study that we performed in the 
first part of this work about HIP BE led us to bring some interesting remarks about the 
security of this protocol. 
Concerning the results of this work and referring to the validation results we obtained, 
we assert that the new protocols meet the security purposes we had in mind when 
designing them, mainly robustness against MitM and replay attacks. 
Those results seem to be encouraging and we sincerely think that an experimental 
experience with those protocols would bring important conclusions about their 
performance in real platforms. This can be the purpose of future work and extensions. 
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